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This paper seeks to make a contribution to on-going debates about how to conceptualise the spatial
processes of renewable energy transition. It makes a case for understanding renewable energy transi-
tions as simultaneously spatial and political processes, constitutive of new territories and conﬁguring
development pathways. Drawing on a case study of South Africa's Renewable Energy Independent Power
Procurement Programme (REI4P), the paper explores the ways in which energy transitions are intrin-
sically bound up with both the materiality and the historical and contemporary politics of land. It then
examines the relationship between energy transitions and territory to conceptualise the ways in which
transitions take on an experimental shape in the form of 'zones'. The paper argues that these zones are
new territories deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative exceptionality, which allow po-
litical and economic actors to exercise authority and commercial power. Two types of zone emerging
from South Africa's energy transition exemplify these processes: legally-deﬁned zones for the devel-
opment of solar and wind energy and zones of socioeconomic development required by REI4P. The paper
explores the spatial and political consequences of these strategies and suggests that these may not
necessarily translate into conﬂict and confrontation, but instead produce uneasy co-existences of
different political, social and spatial projects and interests, with potential to create new polities.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is a long and rich history of engagement by geographers
with energy (see Calvert, 2015), but until recently, the importance
of geographical approaches to understanding renewable energy
transitions has been largely neglected. As Shove and Walker (2014)
argue, energy policy, engineering and material science tends to
focus onmethods for either meeting demandmore efﬁciently or for
reducing CO2 emissions, while social scientists tend to focus on
questions about the politics of access, provision and supply. There
have been basic analyses of some of the geographical dimensions of
contemporary energy challenges at different scales (global,
regional, urban, household); geographers have also used the
concept of ‘energy landscape’ to analyse how different modes of
energy production, distribution and use underpin material re-
lations, such as landscape form and livelihoods (Calvert, 2015;
Nadai & Van der Horst, 2010). However, debates about renewable
energy transitions have tended to focus on the temporal di-
mensions of ‘transition’ and to neglect “the way in which spatialLtd. This is an open access articleprocesses shape energy systems and inﬂuence their capacity for
transformation” (Bridge, Bouzarovski, Bradshaw, & Eyre, 2013, p.
332). Bridge et al. call for interventions that seek to examine the
spatial organisation and governance of new energy systems, and to
generate new ways of thinking about energy transition as a
spatially-constituted process “involving the reconﬁguration of
current patterns and scales of economic and social activity” (2013:
231). As Huber (2015: 27) argues, understanding renewable energy
transitions “will also require new spatialities and new spatial
imaginations.”
In response, this paper seeks to make a contribution to on-going
debates about how to conceptualise the spatial processes of
renewable energy transition, while also making a case for under-
standing renewable energy transitions as simultaneously spatial
and political processes. TimothyMitchell (2011) has illustrated how
the material properties of carbon fuels revolutionised ﬁrst western
and then global polities. Due to its bulk and dependency on labour
to move it, coal gave working-class people and labour unions new
power, acting as a catalyst for democracy and progress. The ﬂuid
properties of oil allowed elites to regain control over energy sup-
plies, devise systems throughwhich tomaximise proﬁts and reduceunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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the ﬁrst time in history to reorganize political life around the
management of ‘the economy’ and the promise of its inﬁnite
growth. The global ramiﬁcations of renewable energy transitions
are beyond the scope of this paper, but it makes a case for exam-
ining the ways in which such transitions are already constitutive of
new territories and polities in particular locations. Speciﬁcally, the
paper ﬁrst explores the importance of acknowledging the ways in
which energy transitions are intrinsically bound up with both the
materiality and the historical and contemporary politics of land.
Second, it develops the notion of energy transitions as a form of
territoriality (Bridge et al. 2013) to conceptualise the ways inwhich
they take on an experimental shape, deploying forms of spatial and
political-administrative exceptionality e ‘zones’ e that allow po-
litical and economic actors to exercise authority and commercial
power. Third, it explores the unintended spatial and political con-
sequences of these strategies, reﬂecting on the kinds of polities that
are emerging and could emerge within these spaces.
The paper develops these ideas through an exploration of South
Africa's renewable energy transition, which has proposed around
600 renewable energy projects, both grid and off-grid and ranging
from utility-scale to household-level systems, in the absence of a
consolidated strategic spatial plan (Cape-Ducluzeau and van der
Westhuizen, 2015). Yet, as this paper argues, spatial processes are
shaping the emerging energy transition and their consequences are
likely to be dramatic. The South African government has recently
committed to a strategy for electricity generation until 2030 that
makes provision for a diverse energy mix. As part of this, in 2011 it
launched the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer
Procurement Programme (REI4P), a public-private partnership that
provides impetus to a low-carbon energy transition. This is an
ambitious programme that attempts to ensure renewable energy
capacity is fully developed while mediating the competing
powerful interests involved and ensuring that some of the proﬁts
are retained in South Africa. To date, REI4P has procured approxi-
mately 5041 megawatts (MW) of renewable energy in four bidding
rounds at costs increasingly competitive with coal-ﬁred electricity
by mobilising over R168 billion (£8.57 billion)1 of investment,
largely from the private sector (Papapetrou, 2014). South Africa has
thus secured more investment for more independent power gen-
eration than has been achieved across the entire African continent
over the past 20 years and, since 2012, has ranked among the top
ten countries globally in renewable energy Independent Power
Producer (IPP) investments (Eberhard, Kolker, & Leigland, 2014).
The scale remains relatively modest when gauged against planned
procurement from other energy sources (7400MW from new coal-
ﬁred, gas-ﬁred and hydro-electricity generation; 9600MW from a
nuclear-build programme; 15,000MW from the Grand Inga Hydro-
electricity Partnership in the Democratic Republic of Congo).2
However, the commitment to sourcing over 40% of new elec-
tricity generation from renewable sources by 2030 represents a
considerable policy shift that positions South Africa as a leading
player in utility-scale wind and solar power generation, and in
which the REI4P is a signiﬁcant driver.
While it is too early to assess the success of REI4P, this paper
examines the ways in which it is already remaking territory,
creating new polities, and producing new scalar relationships1 Currency conversions are based on July 2015 rates. The Rand has fallen steadily
against major global currencies since 2011, when £168 billion would have equated
to £14 billion.
2 These ﬁgures were conﬁrmed in the 2015 State of the Nation Address (see
http://www.gov.za/president-jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2015, accessed 12/
6/15).within and beyond South Africa. It draws on research conducted
between 2012 and 2014, including six weeks of ﬁeldwork in the
Northern and Western Cape provinces. Thirty-six interviews were
conducted with key informants including: two local government
ofﬁcials and three Community Programme Managers involved in
renewable energy in both provinces; CEOs in three sustainable
energy companies; three independent sustainability consultants;
twenty-one individual off-grid energy consumers in ﬁve different
locations in both provinces, and; six sustainable development
professionals. The paper also draws on document analysis of gov-
ernment renewable energy policies, industry and government
press releases, and other reports on South Africa's renewable en-
ergy roll-out. The ﬁrst section of the paper makes a case for the
importance of situating REI4P within histories and politics of en-
ergy and land, focusing speciﬁcally on the simultaneous re-valuing
and discursive occlusion of land within South African renewable
energy policy and debate. The second section of the paper uses the
concept of ‘the zone’ to examine new territories emerging from and
shaping the renewable energy transition. The ﬁrst are zones that
have been identiﬁed as optimal for the location of wind and solar
energy projects, and in which business is being made easier for
international investors in renewable energy. The second are zones
for development surrounding individual renewable energy pro-
jects, which are spatially deﬁned by procurement rules and in
which IPPs are required to deliver socio-economic beneﬁts to the
local ‘community’. Drawing on Easterling (2014a: 1e2), the paper
argues that these two zones are “meta-infrastructures” adminis-
tered by public and private actors and creating “de facto, unde-
clared forms of polity”. They are spaces in which “extrastatecraft”e
activity that is both outside of and in addition to statecraft e is
performed, and in which state and private sector forces have
attained “power and administrative authority necessary to under-
take the building of infrastructure” (ibid.: 2). A critical question in
the context of South Africa is whether or not these two different
zones are also spaces in which a just energy transition (Newell &
Mulvaney, 2013) can occur. Inspired by Tsing's (2005) notion of
“zones of awkward engagement”, the paper suggests that within
these zones global investors and speculators, national and local
government discourses of development, and the autonomy and
desires of the poorest in society exist together in a state of friction.
The paper explores the possibilities for the emergence of new
polities out of these frictions and reﬂects on their likely outcomes.
Finally, it draws some tentative conclusions about the broader
signiﬁcance of understanding renewable energy transitions as
simultaneously spatial and political processes.
2. Renewable energy transition and the politics of land
Approximately 96% of South Africa's electricity is generated by
Eskom, the largest energy producer in Africa (Baker, Newell, &
Phillips, 2014); 93% of Eskom's generation is coal-powered (Tyler,
Boyd, Coetzee, & Winkler, 2011). South Africa's minerals-energy
complex (Fine & Rustomjee, 1996) e a regime of accumulation
that has its origins in apartheid e continues to exert enormous
inﬂuence over the country's energy sector (Swilling & Anneke,
2012). However, South Africa is experiencing an on-going energy
crisis, shifting from historic over-capacity fuelled by cheap do-
mestic coal for commercial and industrial use under apartheid, to
rising demand and falling reserves fuelled by economic growth and
post-apartheid grid expansion. The crisis has been exacerbated by
lack of infrastructure investment, fuelled in large part by uncer-
tainty within government strategic planning. In the late 1990s, the
government drew up plans to partially privatise Eskom, including
divesting 30% of production capacity, outsourcing functions,
creating independent regional distributors and fully corporatising
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some commentators saw this initially as a retreat from privatiza-
tion, but plans for private sector involvement have remained cen-
tral to government strategy. REI4P is one eventual outcome of this
commitment to liberalisation. In the meantime, government has
been forced to commit to massive infrastructure investment in
order to meet rising demand, with R385 billion (c. £20 billion)
invested in 2013, rising to over R1 trillion (c. £51 billion) by 2026 in
a planned doubling of capacity. Over the last decade, Eskom has
been struggling to build an additional 17,000MW of generation
capacity by 2018 amidst a funding crisis that has led to mainte-
nance backlogs and delays (Eskom, 2011, p. 61). Its response has
been expensive buyback agreements with industrial users paid not
to consume electricity, and ‘load-shedding’ (rolling power-cuts)
and year-on-year tariff increases of 27.5% for domestic consumers.
This has been deeply unpopular, stoking suspicions of favourable
tariffs for corporations (Ngwane, 2008) not helped by a widely
perceived culture of secrecy within Eskom.
South Africa's minerals-energy complex is underpinned by an
economy that is structurally dependent upon energy intensive
growth, based on abundant sources of low-cost coal and the
exploitation of black labour (Baker et al. 2014). While the archi-
tecture of South Africa's political economy creates enduring struc-
tures of power between the ﬁnancial sector, parastatals,
government, and the private sector that underpin the minerals-
energy complex, a number of factors have made it increasingly
unsustainable (ibid.). These include: the ﬁnancialisation of South
Africa's resource conglomerates and liberalisation of capital ﬂows
resulting in capital ﬂight; the crisis of legitimacy brought about by
continued exploitation and oppression of black workers; and
increasing concerns about the environmental consequences of
carbon-intensive energy production. Consequently, the last decade
has witnessed a gradual policy shift towards investment in
renewable energy, marked by the 2003 White Paper on Renewable
Energy (DME, 2003), the 2008 Energy Act and the 2010 Integrated
Resource Plan (DoE, 2010a; 2011). At the 2009 Copenhagen climate
change summit, President Zuma pledged to reduce South Africa's
greenhouse gas emissions by 34% by 2020 and 44% by 2025 (Baker
et al. 2014), focusing attention on utilising the country's natural
assets. South Africa has a large area (around 194,000 km2, see Fig.1)
of high radiation and the Northern Cape is one of the best solar
resource areas in the world (Edkins, Marquard, & Winkler, 2010).
Taking advantage of this requires large investments in infrastruc-
ture for both electricity production and transmission to the main
electricity consumer centres (Pegels, 2010). In 2011, the revised IRP
determined that 42% of new electricity generation capacity would
come from renewable sources e mainly wind, solar photovoltaics
and concentrated solar power, 3 with some biomass and
geothermal generation e by 2030 (IRP, 2011). In order to meet in-
vestment requirements, 30% is being procured through the REI4P.
The government has thus taken the ﬁrst step in the liberalisation of
South Africa's energy market and promulgated the beginnings of a
renewable energy transition.
The drivers of this shift are likely to be signiﬁcant in determining
wider outcomes. First, REI4P is a response to the country's esca-
lating energy crisis since 2008 and an urgent need to produce
additional generation capacity to the grid. Wind and solar power
plants are the quickest to build (the government's enormous3 Solar energy has greatest renewable resource potential in South Africa. It pro-
duces electricity either through concentrating solar power, which uses mirrors to
concentrate the sun's thermal energy and heat a transfer ﬂuid to produce steam
and drive turbines, or through solar photovoltaics, which uses primarily silicon
panels to convert solar radiation directly into electricity (Pegels, 2010).investment in coal and nuclear power stations will take much
longer to come on stream). The second driver is the government's
adoption of the post-Rioþ20 ‘Green Economy’ agenda, which sees
economic development as the principal force and outcome of in-
vestment in renewable energy, fuelled primarily by public and
private investments (Sukhdev, Stone, & Nuttall, 2010; UNEP, 2011).
REI4P signals the government's endorsement of this framework
despite criticism that it could produce new power relations of
inequality and injustice (Clemenceau, 2012; Death, 2014). The
renewable energy sector is seen as a key element in a ‘New Growth
Path’ aimed at job creationwhich, given that South Africa has one of
the world's highest unemployment rates at 34% (StatSA, 2014),
remains a critical issue for government. The third driver is recog-
nition that South Africa, as the 12th highest carbon emitter in the
world (CAIT, 2012; IEIA, 2013; Rennkamp&Wlokas, 2012), needs to
diversify its energy mix in order to honour its international com-
mitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, although
REI4P is the outcome of considerable political will and desire to
promote a sustainable renewable energy industry delivering both
cost-effective energy and socio-economic beneﬁts (Papapetrou,
2014), poverty alleviation and inequality are not principal drivers.
Yet, as Baker et al. (2014: 793) argue, the government is aware that
“the production of energy has to enhance the employment pros-
pects” of the unemployed “while also addressing the issue of en-
ergy poverty”.
To date REI4P has awarded 77 projects to the private sector and
20-year Power Purchase Agreements are in place between Eskom
and IPPs. Round 1, completed in 2011, has procured twenty solar
parks and eight wind farms that have already started to come on
stream. Round 2, completed in 2012, has procured ten solar parks,
seven wind farms and two small hydro projects. Round 3,
completed in 2013, has procured eight solar parks, seven wind
farms, one biomass and one geothermal project. Round 4 was
delayed because Eskom was unable to provide transmission grid
access to the new projects, but was completed in April 2015, with
six solar PV projects, ﬁve onshore wind projects, one biomass and
one small hydro project. As Fig. 1 illustrates, a clear geography of
REI4P projects has emerged, with the majority of the solar projects
(including all Round 4 projects) located in the Northern Cape and
wind projects concentrated in the Western, Eastern and Northern
Cape Provinces. Northern Cape has 41 projects in total, Eastern
Cape 16 and Western Cape 9 (WWF, 2015). REI4P is lauded as a
successful model, for South Africa and internationally
(Montmasson-Clair & Ryan, 2014), of a watertight public-private
partnership and tendering process that is competitive and free
from corruption e what has been euphemistically termed ‘ten-
derpreneurialism’ (Eberhard et al. 2014, p. 1). It remains to be seen,
however, if REI4P can deliver energy in ways that are more
economically and socially just than has been the case with South
Africa's traditional energy sector. Its spatial processes and out-
comes will play an important role in determining this; under-
standing these requires a conceptualisation of renewable energy
transition that acknowledges historical and contemporary politics
of land and how they give rise to new forms of territory e political
technologies comprising “techniques for measuring land and con-
trolling terrain” (Elden, 2010, p. 811).
REI4P requires bidders to procure land as sites for development
and to submit environmental impact assessments, but political
discourse concerning REI4P has until recently underplayed issues
of land ownership and value. The discursive erasure of land within
public debate about renewable energy is particularly notable given
that the South African land question is of great political sensitivity
and importance, and in which the minerals-energy complex is
historically embroiled (Freund, 2010). The Natives Land Act of 1913
dispossessed indigenous South Africans of 90% of the nation's land
Fig. 1. Insolation (solar irradiation) in South Africa.
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shortly after the discovery of minerals, providing a source of cheap
labour for extractive industries (Hall & Ntsebeza, 2007). Post-
apartheid governments have made land reform, restitution and
redistribution a priority in order to bring about socio-economic
redress, but the pace of change has been painfully slow. As Hall
and Ntsebeza argue, the land issue is “a complex one that encom-
passes the question of how land is accessed and used … and how
capital is accumulated” (ibid.: 4). Its role in alleviating structural
poverty and job creation is important for policy-makers, particu-
larly given the failure of neo-liberal macro-economic policy to
generate jobs in urban areas. South Africa's renewable energy
transition has particular implications for land use and proﬁtability,
as well as potential to further politicise land ownership. Land
capable of providing opportunities for generating renewable en-
ergy gains a “new source of potential value” (Bridge et al. 2013, p.
335) and such spaces are currently being targeted for commercial
development. These include the ﬂat, semi-arid landscapes of the
Northern Cape, which are preferred sites for solar power, and the
coastal and upland areas of the Western and Eastern Capes, which
are optimal for wind power. In other countries experiencing similar
energy transitions, the effects on land of renewable energy devel-
opment have “become a key arena in the debate on energy policy”
(Nadai& Van der Horst, 2010: 143), yet this has not been the case in
South Africa. Why this is so is likely down to three factors: the ef-
fects of government discourse, REI4P compliancy rules, and the
nature of land ownership in areas targeted for development.The role of government discourse has been particularly notable
in the case of the development of solar energy in the Northern
Cape. An important speech by the then Minister of Energy at an
Investors Conference in 2010 is revealing for what it does and does
not say:
Diamonds that used to attract people to the Northern Cape have
been depleted. We are here to see how we can harvest the
diamond that is the sun in the sky … We are on the cusp of a
world-wide green revolution with a plethora of economic op-
portunities, particularly in solar energy, available to our country
… and this dry and dusty Northern Cape, which is one of the
poorest regions in South Africa, will become the centre of our
response. (DoE, 2010b: 12, 15).
The Minister went on to describe the Northern Cape as having
“excellent and consistent sun” and “ﬂat and sparsely-populated
land”, and she issued a “challenge [to] my colleagues in the
Northern Cape to make Upington one of the Solar Capitals of the
world.” The Northern Cape is thus newly constituted as an energy
resource at the same time as the government is establishing legal
and extra-legal mechanisms through which to create resource ac-
cess (Karplus & Meir, 2013). The province is discursively con-
structed as a resource frontier for the nascent South African market
in renewable energy and its second largest towneUpington, with a
population of less than 75,000 e as a potential centre of a global
energy revolution. Tsing (2000: 119) refers to this discourse as
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claims are made on a global scale as a means for justifying the
rendering tangible on a region's landscape the aspirations of a
national elite. Government discourse is aimed at wooing potential
international investors by creating an almost magical vision of a
renewable energy landscape that does not yet exist in a dramatic
performance which, in turn, creates an expectation that is the pre-
requisite of economic performance. This discursive territorialisa-
tion “does political work” (Bridge et al. 2013, p. 336) in positioning
the South African government at the centre of global energy tran-
sitions and attracting investment, while simultaneously occluding
questions about land.
The South African renewable energy transition illustrates the
ways in which sunlight and wind are now constituted in wider
energy transitions as inert resources for renewable energy projects
while being mobilised as new means for capital accumulation. The
Northern Cape has exceptionally high levels of insolation (see
Fig. 1), but the sun is not a resource that can be directly plundered.
As with diamondmining, land is the key resource fromwhich value
can be extracted. However, the ‘diamond in the sky’ discourse
creates an image of riches being generated from a shared, distant
and renewable resource (the sun) and diverts attention from the
fact that the solar energy production under REI4P is industrial in
scale, requiring signiﬁcant swaths of land (Huber, 2015). The only
hint of this in the Minister's speech is the reference to the Northern
Cape being sparsely populated. While this is true (the Northern
Cape is South Africa's largest and least populated province with just
over one million people), most land is either commercially-owned
(also the case in the sites for wind energy development) or
municipally-owned. Most of the REI4P projects are being built on
commercial farmland (the semi-arid lands of the Northern Cape, for
example, are used primarily for grazing). IPPs thus need to secure
agreements with landowners on transfer of ownership or lease
rights for REI4P projects; as a consequence of prevailing land
ownership patterns, these agreements serve the interests of com-
mercial (mainly white) landowners. In the Northern Cape, land
deemed previously to have low agricultural value escalates in value
when positioned in the optimal zones for solar energy production
(Fig. 1). Landowners choosing to lease rather than to sell will
receive the bulk of the lease payments for renewable energy pro-
jects, on average about 2% of the total revenues over the 20-year life
of the project.4 Given that these are private transactions, it is
virtually impossible to ﬁnd information on the actual beneﬁt
accruing to landowners and it would not be in the government's
interest to seek greater transparency (McDaid, 2014), but the
returns are likely to be considerable.
It is notable that the renewable energy transition has coincided
with new legislation regarding land rights. In June 2014, the
Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act reopened the land
claims process that closed in 1998, giving groups and individuals
who can prove dispossession after 1913 a further ﬁve years to lodge
claims for restitution or compensation. By March 2016, 143,720
new claims had been lodged. The Northern Cape has seen most
claims settled for land restitution to rural communities and fam-
ilies, often involving “tension between mining and agriculture and
the best sustainable land use in the province” (Government of RSA,
2016). Signiﬁcantly for REI4P, renewable energy developers will
now need to include potential local land claims in project risk
proﬁles. The Act at least opens the possibilities for the dispossessed
to stake a claim for land restitution and/or a share of the lease
payments accruing from REI4P. One successful case concerns the4 http://www.climatejobs.org.za/index.php/articles/89-renewable-energy/154-
renewable-energy-for-communities-or-for-the-big-corporates (accessed 12/12/14).Tsitsikamma Community Wind Farm near Wittekleibosch in the
Eastern Cape, built on land where amaFengu people were forcibly
removed under apartheid in the 1970s. The community returned to
the land after a claim was lodged in 1994 and is now a 9% share-
holder of the wind farm (Forder, 2015). However, legislation does
not help those dispossessed prior to 1913 and, in these cases, REI4P
could heighten perceptions of injustice. For example, four neigh-
bouring communities in uMkuze in KwaZulu-Natal recently
brought a claim against Charl Senekal, South Africa's largest sugar
farmer and KwaZulu-Natal's largest private landowner, whose bid
to build a R1.1 billion, 16.5 MW biomass plant was approved in
Round 3 (Potelwa, 2015). Whilst the claim has delayed develop-
ment, it may not be successful because Senekal has counter-
claimed that the land has been occupied by whites since 1880.
These cases are important because they counter the reduction of
energy landscapes to inert resource frontiers and reassert the ways
in which they are simultaneously natural, social and active (Tsing,
2005, p. 29). While land is unlikely to give dispossessed people
power similar to that given by coal to working-class people
(Mitchell, 2011), its material properties as a resource ﬁxed in situ
also give rise to very particular forms of territorialisation and
struggle (Li, 2014). Land rights legislation and claims involving
REI4P projects illustrate that historical land injustices cannot be
erased from South Africa's energy transition. The 2014 Act creates
opportunities for some dispossessed groups to stake a claim for a
share of landowner proﬁts from the REI4P process. However, the
government is equally concerned with demonstrating to overseas
investors that there is political will at the highest level to improve
the efﬁciency of doing business in South Africa in order to counter
investor fears of being bogged down by land claims. The following
discussion examines how it is doing this through the spatial tech-
nology of ‘the zone’.
3. Spatial politics and renewable energy zones
The idea of ‘the zone’ provides an important means of con-
ceptualising the spatial politics of renewable energy transitions and
their consequences. Reﬂecting on globalisation, Aihwa Ong (2006:
91e2) critiques its structural logic, which she argues “create[s] a
galaxy of differentiated zones [technology zones, growth triangles]
unevenly integrated into the structures of state power and global
capital”. This logic reconﬁgures national space and results in the
“proliferation of differentiated sovereignty within and across bor-
ders” (ibid.); it shatters meta-geographical demarcations such as
‘Developed’ and ‘Third World’, which have “re-converged around
enclaves” (Sidaway, 2007, p. 336). Keller Easterling (2014a: 1e2) also
argues that ‘the zone’e “the Free Trade Zone… or any of the dozens
of variants” e is a powerful global form, but focuses speciﬁcally on
theways inwhich space has become infrastructural, which I suggest
has deeper signiﬁcance for understanding the spatial and political
outcomes of energy transitions. According to Easterling (ibid.), the
free zone is “meta-infrastructure” administered by public and pri-
vate cohorts. Free zones are necessitated by large-scale infrastruc-
ture projects, which create a need for an administrative authority
comparable to that of the state, but requiring direction from new
constellations of international, inter-governmental, and non-
governmental actors. They are thus sites of multiple, overlapping
or nested forms of sovereignty, where domestic and transnational
jurisdictions collide. Easterling (ibid.) deﬁnes these forms of sover-
eignty as “extrastatecraft”, operating “both outside of and in addi-
tion to statecraft” and in which “multiple forces e state, non-state,
military, market, non-markete have nowattained the considerable
power and administrative authority necessary to undertake the
building of infrastructure”, far removed from familiar legislative
processes. Extrastatecraft thus describes how power is increasingly
C. McEwan / Political Geography 56 (2017) 1e126exercised not through the language of law and diplomacy, but
through spatial, infrastructural technologies. The following discus-
siondrawson the concepts of the zone andextrastatecraft to explore
the ways in which renewable energy transitions take on an exper-
imental shape, deploying forms of spatial and political-
administrative exceptionality, which in South Africa are gener-
ating very speciﬁc political and developmental outcomes.
Easterling (2014a, 1) argues that free zones are generating “de
facto, undeclared forms of polity” within powerful globally net-
worked systems. Importantly, she suggests that while binary
resistance might seem powerless and irrelevant in infrastructure
space, activists are also able to engage in extrastatecraft and,
through understanding how infrastructure space works, they can
relieve and challenge oppression. This idea that political gains can
be made is also signiﬁcant in conceptualising the spatial politics of
renewable transitions. The free zone is intended to create a fric-
tionless realm of legal and economic exemptions. However, as
discussed below, it often generates other frictions; as Tsing (2005)
argues, like rubbing two sticks together these frictions produce
movement, action, effect. The free zone can thus be conceptualised
as a “zone of awkward engagement” (ibid.: xi) in which different
competing political, social and spatial interests co-exist uneasily,
but not necessarily in confrontation or conﬂict. Spatial planning for
renewable energy development claims to be based on objective
research, but the process by which speciﬁc areas are classiﬁed as
acceptable locations for development is profoundly political, sha-
ped by power imbalances in the political-economy and often
resulting in environmental injustices (Cowell, 2010). In South Af-
rica, spatial planning related to REI4P is creating different kinds of
zones for development that also have the potential to generate
injustices. However, I suggest that as zones of friction and
‘awkward engagement’ they also create possibilities for new, pro-
gressive polities through which injustices may be countered.
4. REDZs: renewable energy meta-infrastructure
Under REI4P rules, a bid can be submitted only once the Envi-
ronmental Authorization is in hand, land rights have been secured,
and the bidder can provide evidence of a notarial lease registration
and proof of land use applications (DoE, 2015). Some cases have
required upwards of twenty permissions, taking over a year to be
processed, and the Department of Environmental Affairs has been
inundated with and overwhelmed by renewable energy projects
seeking approvals. In response, the government aims to speed up
the process by creating zones where doing business will be easier
and quicker for developers, speciﬁcally in meeting the criteria for
compliance. In accordance with the National Infrastructure Plan
(NPC, 2012), Renewable Energy has been included as part of the
Strategic Infrastructure Project for energy, known as SIP8.5 A Stra-
tegic Environmental Assessment (SEA), led by the Council for Sci-
entiﬁc and Industrial Research (CSIR), has been initiated under SIP8
to identify Renewable Energy Development Zones (REDZs) e
geographical areas most suitable for the rollout of wind and solar
energy projects and the supporting electricity grid network. The
process will also provide a platform for coordination between the
various government departments that have a mandate for issuing
environmental authorizations or consents to allow for a more
streamlined authorization process. It is intended that through the
SEA process all participating government departments will be able
to pre-assess the requirements for which they have a mandate and5 http://www.gov.za/issues/national-infrastructure-plan (accessed 15/06/15).
6 http://www.sawea.org.za/ceo-blog/79-environmental-authorisations.html
(accessed 15/06/15).to either issue general authorizations and exemptions or de-list
energy applications.6.
The SEA constitutes the ﬁrst attempt at proactive spatial plan-
ning for wind and solar energy development in South Africa. REDZs
are zones in which large-scale renewable energy development
would be considered most appropriate based on environmental,
social and economic factors. Their mapping begins with wind and
solar raw resource data in order to identify areas of highest eco-
nomic potential, and eliminates areas of environmental and tech-
nical constraint, including protected and environmentally sensitive
areas and agricultural areas. Consultation with provincial govern-
ments, the private sector and members of the public then narrow
down these areas, although precisely who has been consulted and
on what basis is unclear (discussed below). More detailed scoping
assessments have been undertaken in the identiﬁed areas for
agriculture, landscape, heritage, biodiversity, socio-economic sen-
sitivities and other sensitivities, such as aviation, defence, mining,
noise. The outcome is eight proposed REDZs that purport to protect
South Africa's natural and social resources while enabling SIP8
targets to be met more efﬁciently. The intention is for these to align
with the SEA corridors for electricity grid infrastructure expansion
that is being designed to meet energy transmission requirements
up to 2040 (Fig. 2). The process of approving REDZs by government
for the rollout of wind and solar in the Cape provinces was ﬁnalised
in February 2016. These preferred zones now allow for renewable
energy projects and the associated grid infrastructure to be
developed without environmental authorization, subject to certain
conditions, such as adherence to development protocols.
REDZs are spaces of extrastatecraft in that they operate in
similar ways to free trade zones, constituting a legal and economic
instrument designed to provide exemptions to renewable energy
investors and developers, to incentivise growth in the low-carbon
economy, and to facilitate private-sector development of energy
infrastructure. While they are unlikely to exhibit the most extreme
forms of zone law e unlike some free trade zones, REDZs are sub-
ject to civil law and government control e they create territories in
which private, corporatized bodies are able to exert power and
inﬂuence in their own interests. Some players in the renewable
energy sector appear to want REDZs to operate more like free trade
zones, with greater licence for extrastatecraft. For example, the CEO
of the South African Wind Energy Association (SAWEA), a not-for-
proﬁt organisation representing the wind industry whose mission
is the removal of obstacles to sustainable wind energy industry in
Southern Africa, believes that the zoning is too spatially restrictive
and recommends the removal of the requirement for additional
local level authorisations.7 However, critics are concerned about
the extent to which all stakeholders have been consulted in the
identiﬁcation of REDZs. While the CSIR claims that it has engaged
with affected communities,8 a recent study has found that not a
single person interviewed in these communities has heard of the
strategic environmental assessments (McDaid, 2014). There is also
a considerable threat of land grab occurring within REDZs, partic-
ularly if potential investors believe there are too few and the overall
availability of land is too small. Land values are highly likely to
increase within REDZs, raising the potential for the possibility of
corrupt and anti-competitive practices.
Although there is very little public debate about potential land
grab in relation to REI4P, the spectre of South Africa's land question
becoming a lightning rod for protest may have prompted pre-
emptive legislation that counters the discursive erasure in7 http://www.sawea.org.za/ceo-blog/79-environmental-authorisations.html.
8 http://www.infrastructurene.ws/2014/06/05/strategic-search-for-best-
renewable-energy-development-zones/ June 19, 2015.
Fig. 2. Proposed REDZs and preliminary EGI corridors (source: adapted from Cape-Ducluzeau and van der Westhuizen 2015).
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February 2015 indicated that a Regulation of Land Holdings Bill,
likely to become law in 2016, would be submitted to Parliament.9
This will prohibit foreigners, including legal entities whose domi-
nant shareholder or controller is a foreign-controlled enterprise or
interest, from owning land (speciﬁed as agricultural rather than
residential) in South Africa. They would instead be eligible only to
lease land for periods of between 30 and 50 years. This has the
potential to have widespread effects on the country's mining, en-
ergy and agricultural sectors, as well as on REI4P. Successful IPP
bidders, almost all of which have a dominant or controlling foreign
shareholder, have had the option to secure land rights through
either land acquisition or a registered long-term lease. To date
REI4P developers have demonstrated a preference for leasehold
structures, but REDZs make the acquisition of land and land spec-
ulation more attractive. The proposed Bill will thus provide
important protection against land grabs within REDZs.
5. Beneﬁciary ‘community’ zones: development meta-
infrastructure
The REI4P stipulates that communities within a 50 km radius of
projects must beneﬁt from socio-economic development, creating
a second type of zone and forming the “meta-infrastructure”9 http://www.gov.za/president-jacob-zuma-state-nation-address-2015.through which extrastatecraft is practised (Easterling, 2014a, p. 2).
Two speciﬁc criteria pertain to local development within these
zones; ﬁrstly, ‘communities’ are entitled to own 2.5e5% of the
project shareholding; secondly, the private sector is required to
contribute 1e1.5% of project revenues over the duration of the
project to local socio-economic development through initiatives
that promote access to the economy by black people, including
health, education, service delivery, arts and sports programmes
(Wlokas, Boyd,& Andolﬁ, 2012). This is arguably a laudable attempt
by the South African government to leverage local, primarily rural,
economic development out of REI4P and might also be seen as off-
setting the higher price tariffs that have resulted from early pro-
curement rounds. However, as critics have pointed out (see
McEwan et al., 2017; Baker&Wlokas, 2014; Tait, Wlokas,&Garside,
2013; Wlokas et al. 2012), these development zones present a
number of problems.
First, what constitutes ‘community’ is not deﬁned, but treated as
an arbitrary geographically delimited object for development
intervention. In many cases, the 50 km zone in effect comes to
deﬁne ‘the community’. Second, the zone is a homogenised spatial
entity that occludes difference within its boundaries. The areas
surrounding renewable energy projects are likely to incorporate
several social groupings, in separate locales and speaking different
languages, with little cohesion, unity or common identity. They
may also cross municipal, provincial and/or national boundaries.
Failing to account for such diversity is potentially problematic in
the context of South Africa. Third, the 50 km radius produces
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responsibility for community development in these zones and how
development plans are being formulated. For example, De Aar, a
town of less than 50,000 people in an area of the Northern Cape
with limited economic development opportunities is within 50 km
of eight renewable energy projects likely to deliver considerable
revenues10 (Baker & Wlokas, 2014). Similarly, Upington is within
the zones of seven projects, and even much smaller towns, such as
Loeriesfontein and Pofadder (both with populations approximating
3000), are surrounded by projects. Developers have not been
required to make their socio-economic development plans public
and they have no desire to share them with other corporations
given the competitive bid process (McDaid, 2014). This has poten-
tial to cause great confusion within zones in which more than one
private sector company is overseeing community development.
Fourth, there is inconsistency between IPPs in how they are
working with ‘communities’ inside the 50 km zones. Where the
zone incorporates multiple communities, some IPPs have included
all, but in other zones IPPs have chosen to work with just one
‘community’. This inconsistency has the potential to create in-
equities and to fuel division and conﬂict between communities
within and between zones. There is also confusionwhere the 50 km
limit includes large metropolitan areas, such as Port Elizabeth and
Jeffries Bay in the Eastern Cape. In these cases, many IPPs are
ignoring urban and peri-urban communities in favour of smaller,
more easily deﬁned, and often more rural communities. It seems
that the ‘village-as-community’ is far more easily managed as a
space for extrastatecraft than complex municipal urban spaces.
Fifth, the 50 km zones create artiﬁcial boundaries, often dividing
municipal areas, towns or villages, which heighten the risk of
perceived injustice for those excluded. Finally, some 50 km zones
are very sparsely populated, creating difﬁculties for IPPs in meeting
investment requirements. For example, the Industrial Development
Corporation that is ﬁnancing the enormous 100MWXina Solar One
project near Pofadder has applied to the Department of Energy to
extend the 50 km zone because “the area around the project is …
[too] sparsely populated” (IDC, 2014).
As with REDZs, beneﬁciary community zones are spaces of
extrastatescraft because they enable private sector actors to take on
responsibility for assessing local need, determining development
outcomes and building infrastructure. Also as with REDZs, industry
bodies would like greater licence for extrastatecraft in these zones;
SAWEA, for example, has complained that the socio-economic re-
quirements are too high (Creamer, 2011). Early evidence suggests
that community engagement has been poor throughout the bid-
ding process and early stages of project development (Tait et al.
2013), relying entirely on a passive beneﬁciary model, which has
not enabled the formation of positive relationships between de-
velopers and communities. Since community development plans
have not been made public, the REI4P process has:
remained totally non-transparent and can be regarded as
structurally ﬂawed as local communities cannot participate in
planning their own local development without access to vital
information about the project proposed for their area (McDaid,
2014, p. 21).
Responsibility for informing communities about development10 As McDaid (2014) points out, speciﬁc numbers for particular projects are not
available as this information is not in the public domain. However, the ﬁgure for
one project mentioned in her study is R84 million, while according to the
Department of Energy, the average value of adjusted socio-economic development
contribution per MW would be R1,769,475.requirements lies with the project developer because “the detailed
requirements in the bid documents and related guidance notes
have never been disclosed to the public” (Eberhard et al. 2014, p.
29). However, McDaid's (2014) preliminary survey reveals that very
few peoplewithin the 50 km zones understand or are even aware of
the potential beneﬁts that should accrue to them. While partici-
patory planning and community development is known to be
fraught with difﬁculties (Cooke & Kothari, 2001), experience in
South Africa and elsewhere suggests that top-down project
implementation is unlikely to solve local problems and can lead to
conﬂict (Tshikululu, 2010), yet private investors and developers
have not undertaken participatory community needs assessments
and development planning.
Within these zones of extrastatescraft, the private sector is
neither expected nor required to relate to existing governance in-
stitutions in determining local development needs. This is signiﬁ-
cant because the roles and responsibilities for local government
differ from project to project and further complications emerge
from overlapping beneﬁciary areas. Developers are not required to
align with local and national development goals and priorities, and
the private sector retains overall control over how socio-economic
development revenues are spent. There is no regional oversight of
projects to ensure efﬁcient spending and there are no mechanisms
to improve community engagement and representation. Moreover,
there is little accountability on the part of IPPs. After bid approval
projects are often sold, making it difﬁcult to identify who is
responsible for which part of the project (WWF, 2015); the only
legislative requirement is that appropriate sums ofmoney are spent
once the project begins to generate revenues. As with corporate
community development in the energy sector elsewhere in the
global South (see, for example, Banks, Kuir-Ayius, Kombako, &
Sagir, 2013; Frynas, 2005; Gardner, Ahmed, Bashir, & Rana, 2012),
evidence suggests that developers focus initially on high proﬁle
smaller projects to build ‘brand image’ and promote acceptance.
However, this risks “neglecting strategies to unlock the longer-term
economic potential of local areas” (Tait et al. 2013, p. 21), which
might include gender and youth empowerment, and results in a
lack of alignment between development projects and priorities of
local stakeholders.
In terms of meeting South Africa's developmental needs, prior
research has already revealed numerous problems with commu-
nity development requirements (Baker & Wlokas, 2014; Eberhard
et al. 2014; Tait et al. 2013; Wlokas & Tait, 2012; Wlokas et al.
2012). Targeting spending at extremely localized levels may be
inappropriate or inefﬁcient because it cannot be done equitably by
region or nationally, nor can it be directed at areas in greatest need.
Projects are clustered around optimal resources and where land is
available. As discussed, many are in the sparsely populated
Northern Cape, while more densely populated and impoverished
eastern and north-eastern provinces have relatively few projects;
this pattern is reinforced by the fact that there are no REDZs in
KwaZulu-Natal or Mpumalanga. Thus, as with extractive industries
that have created ‘islands of development’ around corporate sites in
a larger sea of underdevelopment (Kapelus, 2002, p. 292), the ter-
ritorialisation of South Africa's low-carbon energy transition is
likely to “generate new patterns of uneven development” (Bridge
et al. 2013, p. 337). Moreover, the outcomes within ‘islands of
development’ are not always straightforwardly positive and there is
already evidence of unintended negative consequences. For
example, McDaid (2014: 43) has found an increase in the number of
gender-based violence cases in one project area, caused by rapid
inﬂux of single male migrants and a sudden increase in local
employment, with an associated rise in alcohol and drug use. There
has been a sudden rise in teenage pregnancies, single mothers, and
increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection rates in project beneﬁciary
11 Community and Household Options in Choosing Energy Services (CHOICES)
project 2012e13: http://www.oneworldgroup.co.za/index.php?option¼com_
content&view¼article&id¼1258:access-to-clean-energy-for-improved-rural-
livelihoods&catid¼207:low-carbon-development.
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risen rapidly (often by a factor of three) in towns close to projects
(ibid.). This is clearly beneﬁcial for property owners, but makes life
increasingly difﬁcult for those too poor to buy their own houses or
dependent on the availability of affordable rental accommodation.
Whether or not REI4P will be successful in creating spaces inwhich
a just energy transition can occur requires further investigation as
projects begin to generate revenues. However, the record of energy
companies in corporate community development in South Africa
and elsewhere in the global South is not generally positive (Farrell,
Hamann, &Mackres, 2012; Kapelus, 2002). There is little to suggest
that the zonal technologies of REI4P will break the mould.
6. ‘Zones of awkward engagement’?
Spaces of renewable energy in South Africa are bounded zones
in localities and simultaneously globalised zones of capital,
competition and speculation. They thus have potential to create
friction. Most early analyses of REI4P view these frictions in largely
negative terms. Baker and Wlokas (2014), for example, point out
that REI4P has prevented many national ﬁrms from entering into
and/or retaining a share in the market. This has been a feature
particularly of Rounds 3 and 4 because smaller national players
have been unable to compete with the low tariffs offered by foreign
companies. One of the reasons for this is that, as Baker (2015: 152)
argues, the most recent REI4P rounds have seen “a surge of
corporate ﬁnanced projects”, with international investors taking
more risks for lower returns “because of their track record and
experience, their access to capital and the likelihood that they have
preferential pricing agreements with equipment manufacturers”
(ibid.: 153).
The market has certainly become increasingly dominated by big
foreign energy and project-development corporations. For
example, the Italian giant ENEL secured more than one third of
projects in Round 3 (twowind and four solar projects) and a further
threewind projects in Round 4 (DoE, 2015). It nowcontrols 938MW
of wind and solar power in South Africa. Norwegian company
Scatec controls 6 solar projects generating 448MW. Other big
players are Ireland's Mainstream Renewable Power and China
Longyuan Power, and it appears that the ownership of the pro-
gramme is increasingly becoming the domain of equity investors
and foreign utilities (Baker, 2015). Evidence is also emerging to
suggest that, following global trends in project ﬁnance, project
developers are selling on their equity to larger players, which will
result in the extraction of capital from South Africa, as has been
witnessed in other parts of the economy (Ashman, Fine, &
Newman, 2011). Ownership of ﬁrms is likely to rest “increasingly
with ﬁnancial investors as shareholdings become tradable ﬁnancial
assets” (Baker, 2015, p. 148). This distances them from their original
productive asset, places emphasis on maximising return on equity
as the key objective, and puts the focus on short-term ﬁnancial gain
and extraction of rents rather than long-term sustainability.
Due to increased competition and falling international prices of
capital equipment, price tariffs are falling for South African con-
sumers (solar PV tariffs fell by 68% in Round 3 compared to Round 1,
and for wind by 42% (Eberhard et al. 2014; DoE, 2013b) and both fell
again in Round 4), but this money is increasingly likely to leave the
country. This is generating fears that REI4P is increasingly unsus-
tainable in ﬁnancial terms and national economic beneﬁts. There is
a contradiction between, on the one hand, the commercial desires
for maximisation of shareholder value and short-term capital gains
and, on the other hand, the government's desire to retain a pro-
portion of capital gains through the progressive requirements for
community ownership and economic development (Baker, 2015).
The government may have intended to create a programme withnational interests at its core, but it may prove difﬁcult to “protect
economic and social beneﬁts… in the face of international capital”
(ibid.: 155). Signiﬁcantly, however, while international speculators
are attracted to invest in REDZs, REI4P ensures that their aspirations
are realized only when mediated through government and local
discourses of development, including a minimal level of local
community ownership. REDZs are thus ‘zone[s] of awkward
engagement’ in which frictions, tensions and contradictions are
being played out. As Tsing (2005) suggests, these frictions need not
automatically translate as negative for local communities. There are
possibilities for stakeholders in beneﬁciary communities to form
new polities and engage in extrastatecraft through which to hold
both private sector and state interests to account for what is being
promised by REI4P. The shape and nature of these polities depends
on both the nature of the community development enacted by
investors and the nature of local activism. As Easterling (2014b)
argues, the key to positive outcomes lies in local communities
understanding how these new infrastructure spaces work and be-
ing able to engage in extrastatecraft in ways that counter potential
injustice.
The possibility of conﬂict between corporate and community
stakeholders is more likely if REI4P appears to be protecting the
interests of global capital rather than resolving “energy apartheid”
(Corbyn, 2010), and there has been a notable silence concerning the
role of REI4P in the latter. There are two aspects to energy apartheid
in South Africa. First is the divide between those who can afford to
pay for electricity and those who cannot. Energy poverty is a
considerable problem: on average, households spend 14% of their
total monthly household income on energy needs, which is higher
than the international benchmark of 10% for energy poverty. Close
to half of all South African households and almost three quarters
(72%) of those in the poorest quintile are energy poor (DoE, 2013a).
This has led to widespread disconnection, in spite of the intro-
duction of ‘life-line tariffs’ (McDonald, 2009: xviii). While each
bidding round of REI4P has seen reductions in price tariffs
(Eberhard, 2013), the Round 4 Northern Cape projects can only be
connected when grid capacity has been increased by 2018. Given
that tariffs are ﬁxed in the REI4P bidding process and capital costs
are likely to continue to fall, this could be a form of arbitrage with
initially cheaper tariffs becoming unfavourable to consumers.
The second aspect of energy apartheid is the divide between
those who have access to grid electricity and those who do not.
REI4P is concerned with electricity generation and is not intended
to respond to the needs of those 12 million South Africans who do
not have access to grid electricity. Consequently, zones of friction
are emerging in which communities adjacent to renewable energy
projects are becoming intricately connected with global processes,
but remain (literally) disconnected from their beneﬁts. Many of the
wind farms are located on the Eastern Cape coast, close to some of
the densest concentrations of people without access to electricity,
despite their relative proximity to the grid. Most of the solar pro-
jects are located in the Northern Cape, which has the least dense
mediumvoltage grid network in the country and vast areas with no
grid electricity (GSEP, 2004). Signiﬁcantly, inadequate energy pro-
vision has been identiﬁed as a key community need in many rural
areas.11 Frictions are likely to emerge from the expectations created
in remote rural areas, in which the South African government has
failed deliver grid electricity, by the appearance of utility-scale
renewable energy plants.
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renewable energy developers to respond to energy poverty as part
of their community development commitments. However, even if
community needs are factored into community development plans,
without grid roll-out developers are likely to experiment with
distributed generation (e.g. mini-grid) solutions, with which there
is already local dissatisfaction. For example, in 2012, the Northern
Cape provincial government invested R1 million in a household-
level solar PV pilot project in the small informal settlement of
Boomplaas, near Keimoes. Interviews with the 16 households
suggest that the project has brought some beneﬁts to most,
including the provision of lighting and the ability to charge cell-
phones. However, some systems have already failed or work only
intermittently12 and all community members are disappointed by
the system's low capacity, having been led to believe that it would
possess similar functionality to grid power. Current usage patterns,
especially poor management of batteries, which result from inef-
fective training of users and technical weaknesses in project design,
are compromising system longevity. Due to the relatively low po-
wer capacity, people's needs e principally the ability to cook and
use a refrigerator, which they see as makingmost difference to their
quality of life e are not being met. No mechanism has been put in
place to provide the required on-going maintenance and engi-
neering support. Furthermore, divisions within households and the
community are being created with householders suspicious as to
why some people's systems work better than their own. Unless
properly resourced, it seems that mini-grid systems as energy so-
lutions for rural communities are unlikely to resolve tensions.
The outcome of friction between global energy corporations and
local people with whom they are being forced to engage remains to
be seen, but as Tsing (2005) demonstrates in the context of
Indonesia, similar frictions in similar zones of awkward engage-
ment have altered dramatically, and not often positively, the lives of
poorer and weaker parts of society. In the context of a just energy
transition in South Africa, it will be important for REI4P to avoid
creating outcomes like those in extractive industries, where similar
social processes and profound transformations have opened ‘social
risks’ to the industrial operation, which have then required cor-
porations to direct resources towards highly conservative forms of
community development (Banks et al. 2013) e support for law and
order, forms of social technology and paternalistic forms of trust-
eeship e that remain wilfully detached from political processes
within communities. However, while Easterling's (2014b) faith in
the possibilities of progressive new polities emerging in free zones
may be idealistic, the requirements of REI4P at least ensure that
developers engage in community development, which could
potentially open up spaces in renewable energy zones for these
new polities.
7. Conclusions
This paper has sought to examine some of the ways in which
processes of renewable energy transition are inherently spatial and
political. The South African case illustrates how renewable energy
transitions are intrinsically bound up with historical and contem-
porary politics of land, creating new territories. Within these ter-
ritories, renewable energy transitions take on an experimental
shape, deploying forms of spatial and political-administrative
exceptionality e zones e that allow political and economic actors
to exercise authority and commercial power. These new spatialities
also set in motion power dynamics, creating zones in which
different political, social and spatial projects and interests are12 Interviews were conducted between 22/02/13 and 28/02/13.forced into uneasy co-existence. These new spatialities and the
frictions they bring could entrench existing inequalities, generating
conﬂict and confrontation. However, drawing on Tsing (2005) and
Easterling (2014b), this paper suggests that they also have potential
to create new polities in which diverse actors e including those
most politically and socio-economically marginalised e are able to
stake their claims.
South Africa's renewable energy transition is notable for the
tensions between government and investor rhetoric on the one
hand, which seeks to discursively erase land, and the nature of
renewable energy transitions on the other hand, which re-centre
land as the key resource and ensure that it is re-valued and re-
politicised. A feature of renewable energy transitions is that they
“require huge amounts of space and territory to generate the en-
ergy that with fossil fuels is simply extracted from a ‘hole’” (Huber,
2015, p. 36). Concerns about the possibilities of land grab by global
investors, in a context in which historical and contemporary land
injustices remain a lightning-rod for political unrest, has led the
South African government to balance attracting foreign investment
with legislation limiting foreign ownership of land. It has also re-
opened legal avenues for land restitution that could complicate
the REI4P process by allowing some dispossessed peoples to claim
either compensation or a share of landowner dividends.
New forms of territory through zoning are emerging from South
Africa's renewable energy transition. These include REDZs e iden-
tiﬁed as optimal zones for the location of wind and solar energy
projects that to some extent mimic free trade zones in making
business easier for international investors. They also include ben-
eﬁciary zones drawn around each renewable energy project in
which private sector actors are charged with deﬁning ‘community’
and delivering development, an area in which they lack experience
and expertise and have no demonstrable record of competence.
This paper has suggested that both zones are types of ‘meta-
infrastructure’ creating spaces of ‘extrastatescraft’ (Easterling,
2014b) in which public and private actors have attained the po-
wer and administrative authority necessary to build energy and
development infrastructure, and to determine development path-
ways. These infrastructure spaces have been lubricated by the
government's shift towards liberalisation and privatization, and
their nature and likely outcomes give some cause for concern. The
level of engagement with people who will be directly affected
within these zones is questionable, the ways in which they channel
further signiﬁcant beneﬁts towards land-owners and private, cor-
poratized interests remains unproblematized, and REI4P remains
detached from thewider politics of South Africa's energy apartheid.
The stories being foregrounded e for example, that beneﬁciary
zones will deliver considerable community development e may
serve to disguise or distract from the enormous proﬁts likely to be
made by both global corporations and South Africa's elites. How-
ever, understanding these spaces as “zones of awkward engage-
ment” (Tsing, 2005: ix) allows for the possibility of progressive
outcomes to emerge from the frictions between global investors
and speculators, national and local government discourses of
development, and the autonomy and desires of the poorest and
weakest in society.
This paper has demonstrated that renewable energy transitions
are spatially-constituted and political processes, rather than pro-
cesses simply affecting places. This has signiﬁcant implications for
policy, not least because, as Bridge et al. (2013: 339) argue, “spatial
difference and the fundamentally uneven nature of spatial in-
teractions are both potentially disruptive to policy because they
complicate many of its assumptions”. In the case of REI4P, the
government aims to bolster electricity supply to the grid through
renewable resources, while ensuring that local communities
beneﬁt from socio-economic development, and understanding the
C. McEwan / Political Geography 56 (2017) 1e12 11ways in which spatial interactions and interrelations are enabling
or frustrating these policy goals will continue to be important as
REI4P becomes further embedded. More broadly, South Africa's
renewable energy transition illustrates the ways in which spatial
and political processes matter in making sense of energy trans-
formations (Calvert, 2015; Pasqualetti, 2011). Renewable energy
transitions produce spatial outcomes and create new territories
that are also deeply politicised and policy-relevant. While these
outcomes are clearly context-speciﬁc, similar spatial processes are
shaping and emerging from renewable energy transitions around
the world. That these remain largely unexamined suggests that
political geography has much to offer in re-engaging with energy,
not simply as a resource in the traditional sense, but as potentially
constitutive of new spatial patterns and processes, new polities and
new development pathways.
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